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Abstract: 
Many commentators have criticised the strategy used to finance regional 
governments such as the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system and 
the limited amount of fiscal autonomy devised in the Scotland Act of 2012. This 
lecture sets out to identify what level of autonomy or independence would best suit 
a regional economy in a currency union, and also the institutional changes needed 
to sustain those arrangements. Our argument is developed along three lines. First, 
we set out the advantages of a fiscal federalism framework and the institutions 
needed to support it, but which the Euro-zone currently lacks. The second is to 
elaborate a model of fiscal federalism where comprehensive powers of taxation 
and spending are devolved (an independent Scotland and the UK remain 
constituent members of the EU and European economy). Third, we evaluate the 
main arguments for the breakup of nations or economic unions with Scotland and 
the UK as leading examples. 
We note that greater autonomy may not result in increases in long run economic 
growth rate, but it does imply that enhancing the fiscal competence and 
responsibility of regional governments would result in productivity gains and hence 
higher levels of GDP per head. That means the population is permanently richer 
than before, even if ultimately their incomes continue to grow at the same rate. It 
turns out that these improvements can be achieved through devolved tax powers, 
but not through devolved spending powers or shared taxes. 
Keywords: economic federalism; policy centralisation and decentralisation; 
currency union; withdrawal from the European Union. 
 
JEL-codes: F15; F36; E6; H21; H87. 
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Summary  
 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 the Eurozone has become a de facto emerging 
economic federation. However, the disastrous performance since the debt crises of 
2008-12, has revealed the EU to be an incomplete union. The real difficulty is that, 
despite much technical analysis and political advice on how specific policies should be 
designed and conducted within the existing framework, there is no conceptual 
framework to guide the policymaking process. Some forward thinking is needed here. 
What is clear from the detailed evidence of events since 2008 is that the crisis has had 
multiple causes: broadly classified as liquidity shortages due to financing stops or 
capital flow reversals; trade or balance of payments imbalances; and fiscal imbalances 
(excess deficits and debt). These imbalances vary in importance and timing across 
countries. The implication is that the policy institutions and regulation have to be able 
to counteract the consequences of all such imbalances; prevent one kind of imbalance 
morphing into another, and remove excessive imbalances. The EU needs better-
equipped institutions rather than specific policies in a world where countries have 
different objectives, different priorities and different response rates. 
On top of this, there are forces in any federal system for the further decentralization 
(devolution) of policy making. Economic theory on fiscal federalism states: in multilevel 
governments, each level of government (including central government) will try to 
maximise social and economic welfare within its own jurisdiction. That would 
necessarily provide a higher level of economic and social welfare than can be gained in 
a regime in which central government provides uniform policies/public goods for all – 
since, having additional policy choices at their disposal, regional policymakers can 
always choose to replicate the central government’s common policies if they wish to do 
so. Hence, decentralisation can always produce better and more efficient outcomes for 
all – subject only to not having devolved so far as to create diseconomies of scale or 
excessive spillovers in the delivery of public services. Two examples:- 
The UK in the EU, outside the Eurozone: Being outside the currency union and the 
institutions needed to support that union, the UK’s concerns have to do with the poor 
functioning and infringements of the single market (principally the financial sector and 
services), and the further integration that comes with EU membership (political union, 
fiscal union, banking union, the social chapter, immigration). 
The distance between the UK’s expectations and the centre of gravity of European 
policy, the fractionalising of political life that follows, and closer relations to the rest of 
the world, all help to raise the pressure to “decentralise” from the EU. 
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Scotland in the UK union: The Scottish Government currently grapples with the 
challenge of supporting economic activity in the face of severely constrained public 
finances determined in London. This creates a debate over how much autonomy 
Scotland should be permitted in order to address its problems. This argument forces a 
distinction between a funding mechanism in which Scottish ministers are held 
accountable (in a narrow accounting sense) for accepting and spending a defined 
stream of money on a pre-specified set of objectives; vs. a regime in which the Scottish 
Parliament has the ability and responsibility to raise and spend the sums of money they 
think would most improve economic performance and the standard of living of its 
citizens. In contrast to the UK in the EU, Scotland’s differences with the UK are largely 
a matter of taste, priorities and culture: a preference for social democracy, for local 
democracy, for a better economic performance that currently available, and a more 
cohesive society – in short a case of preference incompatibilities within the UK union, 
rather than insufficient flexibility. 
Conclusion: Unlike the popular song, breaking up is not hard to contemplate. Far from 
being abstract, the conditions for when it becomes a possibility are easily satisfied and 
are generally in evidence where there are separatist movements. 
What the EU needs, therefore, is robust institutions rather than policies: a) to give 
members the sense of owning an impartial, independent economic framework they 
themselves help operate; b) to introduce a framework in which those who would 
otherwise leave have a say in the decisions as well as those potentially left behind; and 
c) to create a broader, more accommodating set of institutions within which economies 
with different aspirations, priorities and market responses can perform successfully 
without creating tensions or costly spillovers, yet not find themselves so restricted that 
they could do better outside.  
It is obvious that the last is the most important conclusion. Europe, and the UK for that 
matter, needs to recognise that, if they wish to preserve their unions, they have to 
make it worthwhile for their members to remain members in terms of those members’ 
own goals and priorities. That is, to be incentive compatible. It is significant that, 
despite protests and instability in Spain, Greece and Cyprus, it was the Eurozone's 
policies and inability to complete the required institutional and financial arrangements 
which came in for real criticism. Those protests always stopped short of demands to 
leave the Euro or ECB – institutions widely seen to be independent, impartial, and 
where necessary accommodating.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Union, and more particularly the Euro-zone, has always been 
a “would be, maybe” federal union; and since the financial crisis of 2008 it has 
become a de facto emerging economic federation However, the weak economic 
performance since the introduction of the Euro and the disastrous performance 
since the debt crises of 2008-12, more evident in the extreme difficulty of getting 
out of that crisis, than in the fact that it fell into it in the first place, has revealed the 
EU to be an accidental and very incomplete economic union. The real difficulty, this 
lecture argues, is that despite reams of technical analysis and political advice on 
how specific policies should be designed and conducted within the existing 
framework, there is no conceptual framework to guide the policymaking process; 
and little coherence within or between the existing EU/Eurozone institutions (such 
as they are). Some forward thinking is needed here. This lecture is concerned with 
the conceptual framework and questions of institutional design. 
In the delegation literature, principally that aimed at monetary policy and the 
design of central bank operating procedures, but also in the literature on principal-
agent models, the real distinction is between instrument independence vs. target 
independence. In the former, regional decision makers (or decision makers 
delegated to manage a certain sector of the economy) act as agents for the 
central/federal government authorities and have no responsibility other than being 
accountable for having reached the criteria that others have set for them and at 
least cost – without wasting resources, creating additional uncertainties or 
absconding with the money. They have no responsibility for designing those 
criteria; or for deciding what would be the best criteria, the best targets, and the 
best priorities; or whether the policymakers in question have been allocated the 
most effective policy instruments to do the job.1  
                                                          
1 The Euro economies actually lie between target and instrument independence, with 
joint responsibility for selecting some criteria; the UK government has close to target 
independence, while Scotland has effectively zero instrument independence. 
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Thus, under instrument independence, agents have the freedom to use their 
policy instruments as they see fit; and are held accountable for having done so 
most efficiently under criteria assigned by the principal. But they are not 
responsible for the overall performance of their own economy as such, or the wider 
economy of which it is a part, or even whether those criteria are consistent with 
reaching the best possible performance. In the absence of careful coordination, a 
coincidence of preferences, and detailed knowledge of that region’s exact 
circumstances or the spillovers from regions nearby, centrally set criteria will not 
secure the best performance locally.  
Target independence is quite different. Here regional policymakers set both 
the criteria and the priorities for a good performance and pick the instrument values 
so as to produce the best performance for themselves within the wider economy, 
taking into account local conditions, preferences and spillovers. There is still a 
potential coordination problem if there is a conflict between regional optimality and 
optimality in the wider economy. But that is always the case, even for a fully 
independent economy within the world economy. Some safeguards may need to 
be inserted to deal with that problem; but we would need to do so anyway to 
ensure that we benefit from the spillovers from a better performing federal 
economy, as well as from the better performance in the regional economy. In this 
set up, policymakers are held accountable for their instrument settings, and held 
responsible for creating a better performance in their own economy. And they have 
the capacity to create better outcomes because a wider set of choices can be 
made in a problem which is otherwise the same as in the instrument independence 
case. 
To my knowledge, no-one has ever used the distinction between instrument 
independence and target independence in the area of fiscal policy; or used it to 
define and mark the differences between systems with full fiscal autonomy 
(“devolution max”) and those with partial autonomy but still heavily dependent on 
grant revenues, assigned tax revenues, or centrally determined shares of 
domestically raised taxes. Examples of the former, with target independence and 
de facto devolution max include Canada, some Spanish and Italian regions, the 
Channel Islands or Isle of Man; examples of the latter are Australia and Germany 
with a reconciliation of regional revenues through the Australian grants commission 
and Germany’s Finanzausgleich mechanism. 
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Scotland, a specific example in an existing currency union: The Scottish 
Government currently faces the challenge of supporting economic activity in the 
face of severely constrained public finances determined in London. This has 
opened up a debate with the UK Government over how much autonomy Scotland 
should be granted in order to be able to address the problems she faces.  
This argument forces us to draw a clear distinction between a funding mechanism 
in which Scottish ministers are held accountable (in a narrow accounting sense) for 
accepting and spending a defined stream of money on a defined and pre-specified 
set of objectives; vs. a regime which gives the Scottish Parliament both the 
capacity and the responsibility to raise and spend the sums of money they think 
would most improve the performance of the economy and standard of living of its 
citizens. The referendum on the latter option, implying a withdrawal from the UK or 
a radical increase in autonomy, will be held in September 2014. 
The UK in the single market, outside the Eurozone: The UK position on a 
possible withdrawal from the EU is rather different. Being outside the currency 
union and the institutions needed to support that union, the UK’s concerns have to 
do with the poor functioning and infringements of the single market (principally in 
the financial sector, services and external trade/investment), and the further 
integration that comes with EU membership (political union, fiscal union, banking 
union, the social chapter and immigration). The distance between the UK’s 
expectations and the centre of gravity of European policy, the fractionalising of 
political life that follows, and closer relationships to the rest of the world that raise 
the pressure to decentralise from the EU, are the main issues. A referendum to 
withdraw from the EU is tentatively set for 2017. 
 
2.  INSTITUTIONS BEFORE POLICIES 
2.1  Private vs. public sector risk 
The links that convert private sector and foreign debt into public debt, or vice 
versa, can be very strong and will have important implications for the choice of the 
financial regulation system and/or the fiscal consolidation policies. 
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We start from the national accounting identity: S – I = (G -T) + X-M, where S 
= private sector saving, I = domestic investment, G -T = budget deficit (public 
spending less revenues) and X - M = current account imbalance. This identity links 
external imbalances (X-M) and private financing imbalances (S-I) to the 
government’s fiscal imbalance (G-T). It shows how imbalances on the right hand 
side can lead to a banking crisis in the private sector; or how external imbalances, 
even in the absence of fiscal irresponsibility, can lead to expanding public debt, 
capital outflows and a liquidity crisis in which private debt is replaced by public 
debt. In other words, S – I shows when we need financial regulation; G – T when 
we need fiscal control; and X – M when we need competitiveness reforms (or 
monetary policy to shift the Euro’s external value).2 
 If, for example, a current-account deficit appears for any reason (X - M < 0; 
Portugal or Italy), then either the government has to run a budget deficit (G-T > 0) 
or private savings must fall relative to investment (S - I < 0) to restore equilibrium. 
But private savings will tend to rise (with precaution, debt redemption), and 
investment to fall in a recession: S - I > 0. So the more likely outcome is that the 
government’s budget deficit rises. Indeed, if the private sector has been carrying 
too much debt, it will be the first to deleverage in a downturn – creating a banking 
crisis because savings are withdrawn to pay down that debt, rather than invest.  
This causes a loss of liquidity in the banking system and a potential banking 
crisis, which leads to even larger fiscal deficits to rebalance economic activity, or to 
smooth consumption or tax revenues and replace the savings in banks. At that 
point, excess private debt becomes excess public debt. Demand for assets/bonds 
in problem countries will collapse, especially in a currency union where asset sales 
can be sent to low-risk countries (such as Germany, Finland, Netherlands) without 
cost or exchange rate risk. Government bonds in the problem countries are then no 
longer capital risk free, especially if a prospective bailout looks unlikely or too 
small. In such cases, the expected value of a euro held in one place is not 
                                                          
2 Alessandrini et al (2013) find that the S-I and X-M gaps account for at least half the 
Euro’s financial crisis of 2008-12, while Jorda et al (2013) argue that the S-I 
imbalances were the largest cause of excess borrowing in advanced economies since 
1870. 
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necessarily the same as its value in another – leading to a run on the deposit base, 
rising spreads/risk premia and increased borrowing costs. 
One can extend this example by asking, how did the private sector get 
indebted in the first place? If an economy enters an era of historically low interest 
rates, a global savings glut, or on joining the Euro (Spain, Ireland), then savings 
will fall relative to investment in an asset bubble or domestic credit boom (US, UK, 
Ireland) which turns S-I negative. This is not a problem if, or as long as, the credit 
bubble produces a matching trade deficit and capital inflow (X – M < 0): Portugal or 
Spain until 2008.  
But if it does not; or if the credit/asset bubble bursts; or the capital inflows dry up; 
or if there is a deposit run for any of the reasons above, then there will be a 
financing stop, a liquidity crisis and fiscal deficits have to increase (G-T>0) to 
provide liquidity to the banks. This is the story in much of the Euro area. 
This sequence of events provides the links by which poor macroeconomic 
fundamentals and persistent imbalances elsewhere in the economy can easily 
translate into fiscal deficits and a crisis in the banking sector, even if there has 
been no fiscal irresponsibility at all (Ireland, Spain). Fiscal irresponsibility (Greece, 
say) simply adds additional fiscal deficits. The implication is that financial regulation 
has to be able to cover the consequences of all these imbalances; and to prevent 
one kind of imbalance morphing into another, and to remove any excess 
imbalances. The lesson is that the EU needs better institutions rather than specific 
policies to achieve that in a world where countries have different objectives, 
different priorities and different time frames.  
A couple of recent examples may fix the point. First: why is Portugal starting 
to behave like a northern/core Euro-economy, while the Netherlands is beginning 
to look more like a southern peripheral economy? The answer is that Portugal has 
started to repair her X – M deficit, after the S – I financing gap had been 
rebalanced at a new lower level using troika loans, OMT promises, and a great 
deal of austerity. The Netherlands, by contrast, is suffering a financing stop 
induced by deleveraging after a property boom while the external X-M gap remains 
as it was. That means a very stubborn fiscal deficit, and austerity is needed.  
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 Second: what distortions emerge from the German current account surplus? 
That surplus is now 6% of GDP, the budget is nearly balanced, so the S-I savings 
surplus is about 6% of GDP. There are many possible reasons: i) domestic 
investment may have been kept low by repression in the domestic economy (low 
relative prices and incomes); ii) import compression in the rest of the Euro area 
due to austerity; iii) unrequited competitive real devaluations by Germany; iv) the 
Euro lower than it would otherwise have been, switching exports to the rest of the 
world; v) safe-haven inflows from the rest of the Euro area. Any of these factors 
would cause excess savings. In fact the German savings surplus has only fallen 
½% of GDP since 2007, while the fiscal deficit fell by 3%, implying that her savings 
surplus fell to 6% (it used to be higher) – slowing growth, and signaling an early 
start to deleveraging in the finance sector. The counterpart (rest of Euro area) 
external surplus has risen 2½% of GDP, but only since 2011, while fiscal deficits 
have fallen about 3% on average. Deleveraging there has therefore only just 
started and remains small. Hence strong financing flows will still be needed to 
allow the necessary corrections to happen; and the fiscal deficits will remain very 
stubborn, and growth slow, for some time to come. 
 
2.2  Fiscal Control and Fiscal Rules 
Fiscal rules are defined as permanent constraints on fiscal policy achieved 
through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. The five types of fiscal rule are:  
a) Balanced Budget Rules: Balanced budget rules establish targets to 
achieve a structural budget balance each fiscal year. By focusing on structural 
budget balance, adjusted for economic cycles3, the government has some ability to 
run a deficit during a recession, rather than cut spending, provided financing is 
available on affordable terms. But deficits incurred at one point have to be paid off 
by surpluses generated later, to achieve a balanced budget across the cycle. 
                                                          
3 A structurally balanced budget is one balanced across the cycle as a whole. The 
difficulty is to compute this structural measure in real time. In practice, this cannot be 
done accurately enough to prevent misjudging excessive deficits: Hughes Hallett et al 
2012. 
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Some rules, such as the UK’s budget balance rule, specify that the 
government balances its budget on a forward looking basis. The UK’s balanced 
budget rule or “fiscal mandate” requires the forecast structural budget to be in 
balance or surplus by the end of a rolling five-year forecast horizon.   
b) Debt Rules: Debt rules are, by definition, most effective in limiting 
government debt to a specific level. A government with a debt-to-GDP ratio below 
the target level would have scope to undertake expansionary fiscal policies in the 
short to medium term. A government which runs high deficits as it approaches the 
debt ceiling where debt becomes unsustainable, may find itself unable to adjust to 
meet the target, and overshoot it instead of returning to target.  
In the latter case, a strong and credible enforcement mechanism will be needed to 
deal with the possibility that the government’s ability to keep to the rule breaks 
down due fiscal fatigue, political fatigue, or large negative shocks of the kind seen 
in the financial crisis of 2007-8.  
In the former case, where the debt ratio is low, there is a temptation to 
undertake expansionary policies that become unsustainable if pursued for too long. 
To prevent that, a debt rule will automatically impose a minimum primary surplus or 
maximum primary deficit. This allows us to set a self-stabilising rule with a target 
value and a ceiling below which debt may fluctuate. For example, the EU’s fiscal 
compact requires that member states with debt-to-GDP ratios above 60% seek to 
reduce the ratio by 1/20th the amount it is in excess of the target each year. 
What level of debt should these rules aim for? The most recent literature 
shows the level of debt that maximizes growth will depend on what we choose to 
spend our deficits on: the marginal productivity of public capital, including 
infrastructure, is the crucial issue4.   
c) Expenditure Rules: Expenditure rules set limits on total, primary or 
current spending. This limit may be set in aggregate terms, or as a growth rate, or 
as a percentage of GDP.  Such rules can limit the size of government in the 
                                                          
4 See Checherita et al (2013) for the details and an explanation. 
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economy, but may not achieve sustainable public finances unless another rule also 
raises revenues at the same time – which means that taxes increase pro-cyclically 
in a recession since public spending tends to rise in bad times. The Euro-zone’s 
austerity policies have illustrated how difficult it is to operate such rules effectively. 
d) Revenue Rules: Revenue rules may define a floor or ceiling to 
government revenues. But again, since tax revenues are endogenous to the cycle, 
and typically more volatile than spending, governments have found great difficulty 
in operating such rules in practice. 
e) The Golden Rule: The Golden Rule of debt financing specifies that only 
spending on public investment and capital may be financed by borrowing and 
hence debt; the idea being that such investments generate a identifiable rate of 
return. This kind of rule may be looser than the rules above, but recognises that the 
composition of public spending matters for development and growth and should not 
be overly restricted. This kind of rule is used in Germany, and was the rule in the 
UK until the 2008 financial crisis. 
2.3  Sustainable fiscal rules: an example 
Standard results in the literature show that a country’s debt ratio will stabilise 
when pb=(r-g)d: where pb = primary surplus, r the average interest rate payable on 
debt d, and g the average growth rate in national income. In other words, the 
primary surplus/deficit must always be above some threshold value defined by r, g 
and d. Put differently, the fiscal compact does not guarantee sustainable public 
finances: a structural deficit pb+rd ≥ -0.5%, instead of (2r-g), is likely to be too lax 
in bad times (g<0), but too tight in good times (g>0). An example of how the 
primary surplus needs to behave to ensure sustainable public finances at each 
debt level is given in the following diagram (with outcomes under the fiscal 
compact’s 1/20th rule, and under fiscal fatigue: AB).        
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2.4  Fiscal Councils and the Banking Union 
A Fiscal Council’s task would be to provide informed and independent 
assessments of the fiscal position and general prospects for the national economy, 
covering the outlook for public finances, financial conditions, and the main targets 
of economic policy. This would bring the fiscal policy framework back to a system 
of rules that safeguard solvency and efficiency, without the government losing the 
freedom to set out and achieve its own priorities and targets. More importantly it 
would be forward looking. And by entrusting the analysis and judgment of 
sustainability to an independent commission, it would solve the basic credibility 
problem of any fiscal regime; namely that governments are left to judge the quality 
of their own policies, especially those with financing implications that last long after 
the next election or elections. In short, a proper balance between long run 
sustainability and the short-run obligations and opportunities offered by fiscal 
policy, is preserved by the independence of the body making the assessments 
from political pressures.5 
                                                          
5 The establishment of fiscal councils is now required as part of the EU-IMF rescue 
plan for several indebted Euro area economies. Many OECD countries have set up 
and operate fiscal councils: inter alia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 
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Credibility, Commitment and Monitoring: The rationale usually offered for 
a fiscal council is as a mechanism to increase the credibility and commitment to 
sustainable fiscal policies, and to provide a politically impartial monitoring process 
which is available to the economy as a whole. Thus, at one end of the scale, the 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council has an explicit mandate to comment on, and where 
necessary recommend improvements to current fiscal policies, and the extent to 
which they will reach the goals and priorities the Government has set for itself; and 
whether there is a risk of creating unsustainable levels of public debt or extreme 
tax liabilities in the process. The Swedish council may also examine the 
implications for other targets such as growth, employment, income distribution and 
structural reform programmes.  
It may also suggest other policies that would, in its judgment, reach those targets 
better or faster; and it may (and does) comment on the effectiveness of the 
Government’s communications practices (the explanation of, and justification for, 
the policies being pursued). 
At the other end of the scale, the UK’s Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
is required to provide independent forecasts of the future fiscal revenues and 
budget position, including the implications for growth and employment that may 
affect the fiscal position. But it is forbidden from examining or commenting on the 
other targets of economic policy or the merits of the other policies that might be 
used to reach them. The accent here is on forecasting rather than policy evaluation 
or policy efficiency. Neither agency is involved in policy advocacy however. In 
between, there are many other fiscal policy councils that vary in their remits and to 
whom they are accountable; and in staffing and how they handle disputes over 
impartiality in their advice.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK and the 
US. 
6 It is important to note that independence, in this context, involves not only physical 
separation from government agencies responsible for economic policy, but also free 
access to the data, models and information used by government and by outside 
agencies. It is not just a matter of political or personal independence.  
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The first function of a fiscal policy commission is therefore to forecast future 
fiscal outcomes, to monitor current performance, and to analyse the sustainability 
and feasibility of the main targets of the policymakers. That is: it has to operate as 
a second opinion, and introduce an enforcement mechanism to underpin the 
credibility and commitment to the chosen policies.  
Much has been made of the analogy with the need for independence and 
credibility by central banks in the making of monetary policy. These characteristics 
are needed in fiscal policy too; this sector discusses how they can best be 
achieved. But the situation is actually rather different for three reasons: a) a fiscal 
policy commission has no executive authority, and ultimately no sanctions on 
misbehaviour; b) it is most likely to have a wider remit, but may not engage in 
policy advocacy; and c) in order not to add to any democratic deficit, it must restrict 
its analysis or evaluations to be within the targets and priorities set by the 
government of the day. 
Specific Tasks: Traditional monitoring procedures for fiscal policy are based 
on partial rules that are backward looking. In so far as monitoring is about 
anchoring or reassuring expectations of the future, this is a defect. They do not 
imply any specific pressure to modify policies in the light of predictable problems in 
the future. An independent fiscal policy commission should therefore be 
responsible for: a) reviewing the fiscal outlook for the government and the public; 
b) reviewing the future revenues likely to be available; c) estimating key structural 
imbalances; d) estimating the likely consequences of current spending and taxation 
plans, including those implied by changing demography, pensions and foreign 
factors; e) giving advice on correcting any imbalances. 
These tasks should therefore be designed to provide an informed and 
impartial assessment of the fiscal position, its implications for economic 
performance and the future state of public finances. More important, and this is the 
big innovation, it would be explicitly forward looking. All this can be done without 
imposing on the government’s preferences, priorities and targets. However, a 
problem of enforcement remains. A fiscal policy commission can only ramp up the 
pressure to conform to a sustainable set of fiscal policies through public censure – 
but significantly so if the commission itself has genuine authority and credibility. But 
ultimately a determinedly delinquent government would have to be restrained some 
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other way, for example through the graduated “chapter 11” process administered 
by the commission discussed below. 
In this scheme, it is clear that the responsibility for the choice, design and 
execution of fiscal policy remains with the government. Nevertheless, the 
commission’s warnings would force that government to argue openly how they are 
going to maintain sustainable policies and any necessary adjustments, signalling 
that the responsibility for the outcomes is theirs to achieve. Nonetheless there 
remains a trade-off between designing an organisation restricted to forecasting 
likely outcomes, and an organisation with a wider remit to monitor and comment on 
the effect of fiscal policy on other targets of economic policy or macro-imbalances. 
In either case, the point is that improving the credibility and expectations of 
favourable outcomes will strengthen the power of the government’s preferred fiscal 
policies and the likelihood that the targets will be achieved. 
A Wider Remit? Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) argue that a fiscal council 
is needed in order to monitor a government’s adherence to the rules required to 
maintain a sustainable level of debt. Certainly having a sensible debt target, 
chosen on a multiperiod basis rather than period-by-period, implies certain limits 
need to be imposed on the primary deficit. We show how to do that in Checherita 
et al (2013). But there is still the problem that governments may fail to keep debt 
within sustainable bounds, or that they become overwhelmed by financial shocks 
and rising interest rates as happened in the financial crisis of 2008-12. Hence the 
problem is one of enforcement. Fiscal policy councils are designed to help with 
that, creating maximum peer pressure for enforcement. But it would be wise to 
supplement that with coercive rules for use in extreme cases, and define what may 
be regarded as the “safe zone” for the public debt level to operate in. The 
implication is that a fiscal council should examine compliance with the fiscal rules 
needed to ensure sustainability.  
Beyond that, the Swedish and Danish fiscal policy councils, for example, 
have found it important to evaluate the impacts of fiscal policy on growth, job 
creation, investment and the distribution of income. The Swedes have also 
underlined the importance of taking a top down approach: that is a complete model 
approach in order to ensure consistency and credibility in their evaluations. They 
also consider alternative policies and undertake normative exercises to investigate 
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what policies might improve the achievement of the government’s targets. I 
examine this possibility in Hughes Hallett (2013), and conclude that to give such a 
remit is probably unwise because it risks politicising (or giving the impression of 
having politicised) the commission’s remit. That would undermine the commission’s 
reputation for credibility and effectiveness. 
The Fiscal Policy Council Needs Oversight of Banking Resolution and 
Regulation: A Fiscal Council should play a critical role, unrecognised so far in the 
literature, in the regulation of financial services or banks and in the resolution of 
financial institutions in trouble. This role stems from link between private financial 
imbalances, internal or external, and public sector fiscal imbalances, as discussed 
above. 
This may appear irrelevant to fiscal policy. But it is not for sustainability, for 
two reasons: a) establishing a feasible public debt management and resolution 
scheme requires us to separate private risk from public risk (we may wish to bail 
out the former as a liquidity problem, but not the latter as a solvency problem); and 
b) because the governance arrangements have to recognise that sovereign debt 
problems are as often caused by financing stops or trade imbalances in the private 
sector, as they are by fiscal irresponsibility in the public sector per se. Consider 
Spain or Ireland, or the regions within Spain.  
On private imbalances, there are two points to make: a) it would be illegal 
under the proposed Banking Union/European Systemic Risk Board legislation not 
to participate in a private sector bail out, proportional to activity levels, if it damages 
financial services in another jurisdiction (a violation of the single market);7 and b) it 
will be in the interest of any participant to help bail out or restructure an institution 
operating but not domiciled in its jurisdiction, since not to do so would precipitate 
the collapse of at least one institution (and possibly others) in its jurisdiction.  
This argument makes the case for a jointly run resolution vehicle for private 
sector problems; that is, one which is mutually owned and independently operated 
                                                          
7 The local incorporation of subsidiaries is needed to make this work; also for conduct 
regulation, Vickers, Basel III. 
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but which does not involve the mutualisation of debt since the decision to bail out 
will depend on factors that are likely to differ in different jurisdictions and vary on a 
case-by-case basis. But since domestic institutions are usually the largest 
purchasers of domestic sovereign debt, such a bailout facility may become an 
indirect way of bailing out an illiquid or insolvent sovereign. It therefore becomes 
vital, again, to have institutions that separate private risk from public risk: that is, 
separate fiscal irresponsibility from excess private sector debts, recognising that 
the causality may flow either way. 
In addition, the mutualisation of debt needs to be avoided in order to preserve 
market discipline on the individual issuers of debt8; that is, in order to limit any 
moral hazard effects operating on the financially weaker issuers of debt who would 
otherwise have an incentive to issue too much debt at lower cost. Nevertheless, 
there are several reasons for wanting “euro-bonds”: lower borrowing costs in 
distressed economies, better quality debt, stronger collateral for banks (or 
countries) seeking finance to lend for new investment or to back their short-term 
financing needs on the repo market (O’Rourke and Taylor 2013). These are 
important functions, but better supplied through a dedicated Euro level authority in 
order to avoid moral hazard and perverse incentives appearing at the national 
level. 
The separation principle in a Banking Union: The upshot here is that we 
need a regime that separates private sector risk from sovereign risk, but which 
provides a lender of last resort mechanism to underpin stability in the private 
markets while imposing fiscal constraints to rule out the chances of a sovereign 
default. The former property requires a rigorous system of financial regulation (as 
proposed in the UK); but the latter, a system of debt limits with effective sanctions 
(a debt protocol operated and monitored by an independent fiscal policy authority), 
similar to that proposed for the Eurozone in 2011 but rendered inoperative by the 
failure to create a coherent banking union or resolution mechanism.  
                                                          
8 It is clear from data on spreads that market discipline was focused on the Euro-area 
as a whole, not on national borrowing, until 2010 when the markets realized that 
country bail-outs might either not be forthcoming or not be large enough: see 
Alessandrini et al (2013) 
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Then, having separated the two components, problems in the financial sector 
can be treated independently, and on merit, with targeted lending of last resort by 
the financial regulator, where justified, through the resolution process above. By 
contrast, unsustainable fiscal policies will be monitored independently, and 
eventually ruled out in favour of technocratic solutions recommended by the 
regional Fiscal Policy Council, in effect suspending the policy process until 
sustainability can be restored. Thus fiscal councils need to play a crucial observer 
role in the financial regulation and resolution process too. Given this framework, 
markets and policymakers can then, in normal times, pursue their own interests 
without constraint – unless their decisions would lead, predictably, to insolvency.                                              
 
3.  FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS IN A CURRENCY UNION 
Simple funding mechanisms, such as a block grant or straightforward tax 
assignments, cannot give a regional government the capacity to improve the 
economy on a systematic basis. Instead they are simply a means to secure a 
certain stream of funding. The mechanisms more broadly are: block grant funding; 
tax assignment schemes or apportioned taxes; partial fiscal autonomy; fiscal 
federalism; full fiscal responsibility/autonomy or outright independence.  
3.1  Funding the National or Regional Economies 
Partial Fiscal Autonomy: Block grant systems have been widely criticised, 
not least by the UK government9. On the other hand, funding schemes with limited 
autonomy are often unworkable because they require information on future tax 
revenues that no policymaker can possibly have when they make spending 
allocations. And if borrowing for current spending is prohibited, they contain no 
mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable 
revenue flows until reconciliation several years after the event. Proposals of this 
kind therefore retain the very problem which all governments wish to avoid: 
revenue volatility. Moreover, any attempt to fix this problem by using official 
forecasts of future tax revenues, allowing borrowing, and reconciling the forecasts 
                                                          
9 House of Lords (2009); McLean et al (2008) 
Andrew Hughes Hallett, Is Independence Possible in an Interdependent World?  Scotland vs. the UK's Participation in the European Economy 
18 
 
with actual receipts later, introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for 
quarrels between the centre and the regions, a long term deflation bias, and a net 
loss of devolution.  
There is a fourth problem, generic to any kind of partial devolution. Revenues 
that depend on a shared tax base will vary up and down with decisions taken by 
another tax authority, over which the regional government has no responsibility or 
control. The only way out of this difficulty is to devolve the entire tax code for a 
particular tax, not a part of it. That means devolving all the tax rates, tax bands and 
tax base for each tax power devolved; in other words, independence for each 
devolved tax. If this is not done, the regional government will have to raise or lower 
its own tax rates to compensate for changes made at the centre each time a 
change is made there. But that would take us straight back to a system where the 
effective revenue flow is determined by decisions made centrally, and devolution is 
lost. Put differently, a small amount of autonomy will automatically generate new 
pressures for greater autonomy.  
Efficiency and Political Accountability: Generally, we can argue that more 
devolution is better than less for two further reasons. First because wider 
devolution is better as a matter of system design (internal diversification to stabilise 
revenues; insurance against the effects of unrelated policy changes); second 
because it implies responsibility for creating a better domestic economic 
performance, as well as accountability in a strict legal sense. Since both are 
desirable, more is better than less.  
Fiscal Federalism: There is an extensive literature on the economics of fiscal 
decentralisation, or “fiscal federalism”, starting with the work of Musgrave in the 
1950s and Oates in the 1970s. The conclusion of that literature is that 
decentralisation, hence fiscal responsibility, typically leads to better economic 
performance – both in theory and in practice. The argument is usually put in terms 
of economic efficiency: decentralisation provides an efficient way to correct various 
forms of market failure, ensure an equitable distribution of resources, and stabilise 
regional economies and employment. To deny that, one must show that a single, 
centralised, monolithic government could or indeed would succeed in maximising 
social welfare across all regions out of a sense of benevolence, despite the 
electoral pressures and special interests in a multi-region democracy. 
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In practice, where there are regional differences in structure or resources, or 
in the way economies respond to shocks or policy changes, or in a region’s 
position in the cycle, it would be very hard – if not impossible – for any one 
government to come up with one set of policies that satisfied everyone in the sense 
of maximising wellbeing. Different regions will require different solutions to suit their 
particular circumstances. It would also be doubly difficult if: 
 the central government has less precise information on local 
needs/conditions; or  
 if its policies are helpful in one place, but have adverse spillovers on 
another; or 
 if central government is less accountable because of political distance from 
the regions; 
 or is subject to special interest groups because of the electoral calculus of 
majority rule. 
As a result the provision of public goods, and stabilisation of employment 
would be inefficient, and the performance of the regional and aggregate economies 
would fall below potential.  
This line of argument is sufficient to demonstrate the classic “decentralisation 
theorem” of Oates (1972): in multilevel governments, each level of government 
(including central government) will maximise social and economic welfare 
within its own jurisdiction. That would necessarily provide a higher level of 
economic and social welfare than can be gained in a regime in which central 
government provides a uniform set of policies and public goods for all – since, 
having additional choices at their disposal, regional policymakers can always 
choose to replicate the central government’s common policies if they wish to 
do so. Hence, decentralisation will always produce better and more efficient 
outcomes for all, including for the central government – subject to not 
devolving by so much as to create diseconomies of scale or excessive 
spillovers in the delivery of public services – if the policymakers wish to take 
that opportunity. 
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The standard response to this argument has been that the same result can 
be achieved by a common set of policies plus a set of lump sum transfers 
(subsidies, grants, side payments) to each region, chosen to allow the same local 
outcomes. This may be true: but it just reproduces a grant type system. It also 
means that grants may have to be more generous in some regions than others; it 
imposes no accountability on those who raise the grants, or on those who spend 
them. Moreover, if those grants are to respond to local conditions, and if there are 
structural or cyclical differences between regions, or more accurate information at 
the local level, or if central govern-ment finds itself fiscally constrained, then we will 
have to ask regional governments to decide on those grants themselves – giving 
rise to even less accountability and more perverse incentives.  
It would therefore be better to ask regional governments to raise and spend 
their own revenues. At least they are then accountable to their own electorate and 
must bear the pain of their spending decisions; but they can still profit from more 
precise information on local conditions, differences, preferences, with some 
protection from blocking coalitions elsewhere in a centrally determined system. The 
result would be more effective policies: higher growth and higher employment than 
is possible under a grant or assigned taxes. 
3.2  Allocating Responsibilities 
The argument so far makes the case for fiscal autonomy in a federal system. 
The question now is to decide how far this autonomy should go. Regional 
governments will recognise that they have limited abilities to influence local 
employment or prices, or play an active stabilisation role, or to borrow. Central 
governments therefore retain a defining role to ensure coordination, monetary 
stability, stabilisation; and in competition policy and providing financial regulation 
and financial stability (albeit subject to representation from the regions). 
Allocating Policy Instruments and Responsibilities: Our arguments so far 
suggest a natural way to allocate policy instruments between central and regional 
governments. The power to tax immobile factors, property, natural resources 
should be allocated to regional governments. They should also be able to set user 
fees, benefit taxes, and spending; i.e., have the power to raise income, sales, 
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corporate or business taxes, and the social security taxes that affect mobile 
factors, production costs and competitiveness; and also control spending on 
health, education, police and justice, infrastructure, R&D, innovation, and 
development. The latter are all instruments that affect productivity growth in the 
short and long run; and unit labour costs – and hence employment and the cost of 
doing business. Unusually, perhaps, taxes on mobile factors are included here 
because the ability to set taxes equal to the marginal cost of providing services at 
the regional level is necessary if households and firms are to choose locations that 
provide the most efficient level of services – and to give governments a direct 
incentive to supply those services efficiently. But more importantly, they are the 
policy levers that allow a regional government to promote growth, employment and 
a better economic performance in their region.  
In general, this will not be competitive (“beggar-thy-neighbour”) with neighbouring 
regions since a better performance in one place will spillover positively to help the 
regions next door, just as it does between neighbouring countries. It is not a zero-
sum game therefore. 
By contrast, the “framework policies” that affect monetary conditions, price 
stability, financial stability, taxes/spending for revenue insurance/risk sharing, 
competition and regulation policy, mechanisms for internal/external coordination, 
and commercial policy (tariffs, trade barriers, exchange rates) are better left with 
the central government. This allocation of policy instruments has been made 
according to their comparative advantage for achieving the objectives of regional 
and central governments respectively. 
Size of government: This type of allocation scheme emphasises the 
importance of creating own sources of finance in a devolved system. A regime that 
relies on grants or tax assignments, by contrast, provides a fatal incentive to 
expand public spending programmes beyond their efficient level by pressing the 
centre to shift more in their direction, or by asking the centre to expand the 
common debt issue in order to allow that to happen. The prospect of an easy bail-
out, or easy guarantees for local debt issues, would have the same effect. Creating 
own financial sources overcomes that problem by passing responsibility and 
accountability over to the regions.  
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There may be a concern that these arrangements could lead to an expansion 
of government, with overlapping or conflicting functions at different levels. This will 
be minimised if policies and responsibilities are chosen according to comparative 
advantage. In that way, the distortions and inefficiencies that might otherwise arise 
from excess fiscal competition will be kept below the inefficiencies which appear 
with central financing. In practice, it appears that this tendency for larger 
government is weak and depends on the form that devolution takes, not its 
existence.10 The key point is, where decentralisation is built around raising taxes 
(as in tax devolution), it is typically associated with smaller government.  
But where it is financed by transfers or grants, as in spending devolution, there is a 
tendency to larger and less efficient government. Devolving tax powers is likely to 
lead to smaller and leaner government therefore. 
Devolving Fiscal Responsibilities in Practice: It is now possible to set out 
a fiscal framework that contains tax autonomy or devolution max, but which retains 
institutional links to central government to maintain coordination, to allow risk 
sharing and to align regional fiscal policies with the framework policies of the 
federal government. By maximising own source financing, regional governments 
can increase accountability and realise the efficiency gains. Institutional measures 
to support the management of risk, risk sharing, monitoring and fiscal oversight are 
then needed to bring credibility and stability to the system.  
To see how this could work in practice, we start from an example of the 
Basque-lands and Navarra which operate rather successfully in Spain. These 
areas pay the Spanish government about 9% of their revenues as “rent” for 
common services: defence, security, foreign/diplomatic service, central 
administration, contributions to Spain’s EU dues and debt servicing. In 2009-08, a 
comparable sum for Scotland would mean a contribution of £6bn to the UK 
government. To this we might add another 1% of GDP in solidarity funds to allow 
the UK government to make its own redistribution and stabilisation payments. 
These funds mirror the UK’s own payments to the EU budget for solidarity 
purposes. 
                                                          
10 Oates 1985, 1989, Rodden 2003. 
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Power over the remaining taxes and expenditures could then be allocated to 
the regional government: that is those noted above, but also include an assigned 
share of VAT (control over the VAT rate or its coverage may not be devolved by 
EU rules); plus other sales taxes; capital gains and inheritance taxes; fuel tax; 
social security, payroll taxes/nonwage costs (giving national governments control 
over competitiveness); “cap and trade” (including auctions under the EU-ETS); 
environmental taxes; financial market levies; council tax; tax concessions; 
operating surpluses of statutory bodies; and the smaller taxes (stamp duty; alcohol, 
tobacco and vehicle excise duties; passenger duties). New revenues might include 
landing fees for natural resources on the Australian model, licence fees for 
electricity generation, taxes on caffeinated alcohol, green taxes or licensing, a land 
tax, repatriating interest payments on a share of debt in favour of interest payments 
on each region’s direct contributions to debt. 
 
As a practical matter, and to start the process off, since we would be moving 
into a world of variable revenues for the first time, priority should be given to 
allowing the power to borrow; then to devolving power over taxes that affect the 
rate of return on labour – specifically national insurance contributions and payroll 
taxes paid by employers, also business taxes and corporation tax. Since the 
administration of some of these taxes may be complicated (how do you realistically 
determine how much of an internally integrated corporation’s profit actually arises 
in each of its differently located plants?), there are various simplified ways to 
devolve these taxes – such as giving R&D credits in a unified system; apportioning 
the tax liabilities in proportion to employment by plant and location; or allowing 
corporation tax rate reductions in proportion to, and only when, the regional GDP 
falls below the national average. 
 
It is further proposed to take pensions out of the social security system. This 
would require social security contributions to be made into a separate tax – as it is 
in many EU countries now – instead of the current system which is to fund social 
security from general taxation and national insurance contributions. Pensions can 
then be paid out of a common federal insurance fund. 
 
Finally we stress the most important feature of fiscal autonomy is that it 
transfers to the regional government the means to control the tax base and 
exemptions, as well as tax rates and tax bands, as a way to expand the revenues 
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and scope of the devolved taxes. This is founded on the simple observation that 
the elasticity of tax receipts is always larger to plausible variations in the aggregate 
level of taxable income, than it is to plausible variations in the average tax rate. For 
example, in a linear system, the actual elasticities are equal (they are both unity); 
but a 4% annual rise in nominal taxable incomes would require annual increases of 
1% point in average tax rates to match the contributions to tax revenues being 
made by the expansions of the tax base (when the average tax rate is 25%). Tax 
increases on that scale are neither plausible, nor likely to be politically acceptable. 
In a progressive tax system, the advantage is not so marked: taking a quadratic 
approximation, the elasticities are 1+2t for changing tax rates and 1+t for changes 
in the tax base. That could cause us to modify our strategy at high tax rates (large 
values of t). But the general point is that, in a progressive system, it will be more 
important to gain control of the base and tax bands, than it is to get control of tax 
rates. 
 
Note also that automatic transfers (that is, additional risk sharing elements) 
are built in to this arrangement to provide an automatically stabilising force for the 
economy via the central budget. This will help reduce the regional government’s 
need to borrow for spending purposes. 
 
3.4  Institutional Support 
Some new institutional arrangements are needed if the region is to realise the 
gains of fiscal autonomy. Devolution reduces the inefficiencies that stem from a 
centralised one-size-fits-all set of policies, and so improves economic performance. 
But it may create conflicts in the form of free riding; or spillovers that damage 
performance elsewhere if not restrained by regional governments or by the central 
government. Consequently devolution is at its most effective, and the gains from 
fiscal autonomy largest, when there is diversity of structure, circumstances, pref-
erences, and when the spillover effects of local action are small. Since central 
government has a comparative advantage in imposing coordination, discipline, and 
setting the general thrust of policy, the best way to realise those gains is to create 
a decentralised scheme in which there are small grants to, or rents from, the 
regions to the centre; with institutions interposed to secure both coordination and 
the gains of accountability. 
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We suggest an Economic Policy Forum, drawn from the network of fiscal 
policy councils, to reassure the federal government that each region is operating 
within a macroeconomic frame-work which is consistent with the rest of the union. 
It could distribute any payments, loans, or grants to/from the centre for solidarity or 
stability, and set bail-out insurance contributions. It would also contain 
representatives from the federal government and each devolved government, to 
reach agreed decisions on matters of joint interest and resolve conflicts. The 
Forum would have authority to recommend changes to the policies of any of the 
constituent regions. Such recommendations would be advisory by majority, binding 
with unanimity, and would discuss potential retaliations in cases of severe 
disagreement.  
3.5  Fiscal discipline and debt control 
Decentralising fiscal policy may lead to fears of weaker budgetary control. 
Although there is no reason why regional governments should be worse in this 
regard than central government, there is always a temptation to over-expand and 
export the burden of financing, tax raising, and paying-off debt to others. Borrowers 
may calculate (perhaps correctly) that central government would then prefer to bail 
them out rather than risk the financial disruption that would follow should they 
default. Thus a real or perceived guarantee of a bail out creates moral hazard 
among both borrowers and lenders, increasing the risk of default.  
There are four mechanisms which can be used to contain such behaviour:  
 Increasing the accountability of the regional governments through greater 
autonomy;  
 The risk sharing transfers found in fiscal autonomy. This will depend on the 
existence of a central budget and automatic transfers to/from that budget;  
 Enforceable limits on the size deficit or debt; and 
 An independent fiscal policy council charged with monitoring of the 
government’s plans.  
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The need for greater accountability implies fiscal responsibility is the 
appropriate regime. It also depends on the policymakers’ concern for reputation. A 
funding collapse would suggest that the regional government had failed and leave 
them accountable to the censure of the voting public – the more so the more 
autonomy has been granted. Discipline therefore calls for more autonomy rather 
than less, backed by some visible restraint/punishment mechanism.  
Risk sharing however depends on the existence of a central budget and 
automatic transfers to/from that budget. Risk sharing also flows from the cross-
border ownership of stocks, bonds or other income sources; and from cross-border 
lending and credit. So there will always be some risk sharing where there are 
integrated markets for capital, investment and short term financing. However the 
presence of central government raises a new problem: moral hazard, the 
perception that excessive deficits will be bailed out or otherwise “insured” by loans 
supplied by the central government. Moral hazard blunts the incentive to maintain 
fiscal discipline; to shrink deficits in good times or to prepare for bad times. For that 
reason, it is better to have regional stabilisation, rather than central insurance and 
soft budget constraints. In other words, it is better to have more extensive 
devolution rather than less, or centrally determined lending for that matter. 
The third mechanism is to impose enforceable limits on the size of fiscal 
deficits and debt. In the Euro-zone, the problem with such limits has been two-fold. 
First they have proved difficult to enforce. Second, our ability to monitor deficits in 
real time to detect significant deteriorations is limited. Early releases of deficit 
figures, and the data necessary to strip them of their cyclical components, are so 
imprecise that the ability to detect violations reliably is only achieved after four 
years; too late to take any corrective action or to induce such actions through the 
threat of fines. It is better to focus on limits to debt.  
A debt target is useful for many other reasons. First, debt is what has to be 
financed, and what causes default risk. Second, the debt burden is more clearly 
defined: what has and needs to be borrowed is known to the markets since they 
hold the paper. Third, debt is a moving total of past deficits and hence represents 
the structural position we wish to monitor. Fourth, debt is a stock and not a flow. 
That means it is persistent, which will make policymakers forward looking in their 
plans and, by extension, make their plans more credible – or at least more easily 
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tested for credibility. Moreover, persistence gives them an incentive to restrict debt 
in order to preserve freedom from financing constraints in the future.  
However, an effective monitoring agency is still needed to overcome two 
defects in the existing monitoring schemes; first that they are partial, and second 
they are purely backward looking. They do not imply any pressure to modify fiscal 
plans in the light of future problems. To get round that, we propose an independent 
Fiscal Council in each region. These councils would be responsible for reviewing 
the fiscal outlook, the revenues likely to be available, the current structural position 
and likely consequences of current spending policies for sustainable public 
finances, including the effects of changing demography on pension and health 
costs.  
To ensure that effective debt limits will be enforced, we propose the following 
mechanism: 
 The federal and regional governments jointly operate a central budget as 
above; 
 The debt targeting system should be set up as a debt target value and an 
upper boundary; 
 The space between the target and upper boundary should be divided into 
three ranges.  
If the debt target was set at 45% of GDP, and the ceiling at 60%11, the 
excessive debt protocol ranges would be from 45% to 50%; from 50% to 55%; and 
from 55% to 60%. The first range would be the range of normal fluctuation. If the 
debt ratio entered the second range, the regional fiscal authority would be placed 
on the watch list and subject to comment and advice from the Fiscal Council. Any 
support or advice from the Fiscal Council would become conditional on 
improvements being made. If the level of debt entered the third debt range, this 
would trigger public warnings and mandatory policy changes. Finally, if the debt 
                                                          
11 The EU Council of Ministers adopted the idea of formal debt limits in its declaration 
of 26 June 2012, but gave little idea of how those limits should be set or how a debt 
target value could be set to give a “safe zone” in which shocks can be absorbed.  
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ratio rose above 60%, all guarantees would be lifted. The regional government’s 
fiscal budget would be placed in “chapter 11” administration, with the regional 
Fiscal Policy Council running government spending and taxation until the 55% limit 
was regained. 
3.6  Advantages of full fiscal autonomy/independence 
The proposals here are predicated on the value, to central government, of a 
consistent economic framework across regions; of saving money by abandoning 
block grant funding formulae and reallocating spending decisions; of being able to 
create better economic results in the regions via devolved taxation. This is a 
constitutional arrangement with gains for both sides.  
The Impact of Fiscal Autonomy on Growth and Productivity: How do 
gains in efficiency and economic management from decentralised fiscal policy 
translate into better outcomes? The answer is via higher productivity. This is most 
easily seen through the distinction between a systematically higher growth rate and 
higher levels of income per head.  
First we need to clarify that there is no robust evidence that greater fiscal 
devolution is associated with higher rates of GDP growth; and second to affirm 
that, to the extent that fiscal devolution produces higher levels of GDP per head, it 
does so through the devolution of tax and revenue raising powers – not through 
the devolution of spending powers. 
On the first point: it is true that there is no evidence of permanently higher 
long term growth rates, but fiscal devolution does increase the level of GDP per 
head. Permanent growth rate changes, by contrast, must depend on other factors 
and cannot be the result of an increase in the degree of fiscal devolution alone. 
Other factors, an increase in the growth of innovation and technical progress, or in 
the labour force, need to be involved. This distinction is made clear by: 
 “There are two reasons to be cautious with these results. First, although they 
are quoted as leading to higher growth rates, growth models in economics 
usually show that the result of a one-off increase of some growth creating 
factor is an increase in the level of output, not a permanent increase in 
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growth rates. For a permanent increase in the growth rate, continuing 
increases in that factor would be needed every year. But the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation cannot go on increasing without limit; and even if the 
consequences of an increase in devolution took some time to be realised, 
they would eventually come to an end.”12 
Why should these performance improvements be expected? On the 
second point, a survey of the available academic research is given in a paper by 
Feld and Schnellenbach (2010). This survey provides an argument from first 
principles, based on work by Brueckner (2006), that greater fiscal autonomy will be 
unambiguously associated with higher output levels and possibly higher growth 
rates if taxes move to support the chosen levels of public spending; that is, if tax 
devolution is included along with spending devolution. This result continues to hold, 
and robustly so, if tax competition is allowed between regions. But it does not 
follow if the tax regime involves a shared tax base, as is proposed in the Scotland 
Act. There are also arguments that fiscal autonomy will deliver better economic 
performance when ignorance of regional conditions, pork barrel spending or central 
coercive power are serious problems.  
These arguments therefore imply that greater fiscal autonomy might be 
expected to deliver a better economic performance in terms of GDP per head. 
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee of that if policymakers turn out to be 
incompetent or the economic institutions weak; or if shared tax bases are involved. 
But that is true in any economic system. And it is especially true in partial 
autonomy schemes since they, unlike full fiscal autonomy or genuine fiscal 
decentralisation, depend on a shared tax base. This again makes a clear case for 
why it is better to go for extended devolution (target independence) rather than a 
partial scheme. 
Spending Devolution vs. Revenue Devolution: The second issue is what 
kind of fiscal instruments should be devolved? There is no evidence that, if fiscal 
autonomy raises GDP per head, it does so through the devolution of spending 
powers. If anything, the opposite is true. The evidence on that point is emphatic: 
                                                          
12 Hughes Hallett and Scott (2010), p38. 
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expenditure devolution depresses GDP levels, while devolving revenue powers 
increases them. To quote Feld (2011): 
“Revenue decentralisation has the expected positive effect on productivity, 
and is consistently highly significant. Expenditure decentralisation, however, 
has a robust and highly significant negative effect on productivity ….” 
It should also obvious that adding revenues to the devolved expenditure 
instruments will, other things equal, lead to a better economic performance 
because doing so adds to the number of choices the government can make (for 
example, by choosing the size of the budget as well as what that budget is spent 
upon). It would therefore be best to devolve both spending and tax raising powers. 
But if it is required to choose between the two, then, in the light of the evidence 
above, it will be better to devolve tax raising powers before spending powers. 
 
4.  The SIZE AND BREAK-UP of UNIONS: Scotland and the UK 
The analysis so far puts little emphasis on whether greater debt control, 
fiscal consolidation and greater regulation would be possible or acceptable in 
practice: that is, on the political economy of sustainable economic policies widely 
interpreted. We close that gap by using a strand of research developed by Alberto 
Alesina to reintroduce political economy into the story: namely, his work on the 
size, number and break up of nations.  
The link to the fiscal rules literature above may appear tenuous. But the 
difficulty that the European Union has had in forging a fiscal union, suggests that it 
is far from a separate issue. As the sections above imply, divergence and 
disagreements are driven mainly by conflicts between increasing returns in the 
provision of public goods (including the use of common policies) vs. the costs 
caused by structural differences, income differences, and cultural or preference 
differences given the political opportunity to articulate them: 
a) Not everyone will agree on the correct balance of policies with respect to 
national objectives for inflation vs. output growth or employment – not to mention 
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the priority for financial stability. Even if we can agree on the goals, there are likely 
to be disagreements on the relative importance of those goals and on how the 
economy should be run (degree of regulation, size of government).   
b) Not everybody agrees, or can agree, on the size of debt to aim for – or 
whether a debt target at the national, sub-national, or union level should be 
allowed. This is as true in the Euro zone as it is outside (in the US for example). 
c) Preferences for spending on social support (vs. defence, infrastructure, 
culture), education, health, elderly care and other entitlements vary widely. The 
values thought appropriate for the size of the fiscal sector, d*, will vary accordingly. 
d) Not everyone agrees on the best target for income distribution, or whether 
income distribution should even be a target of policy. This means they will not be 
able to agree on the best means of increasing or decreasing the primary surplus pb 
(that is, using taxes vs. spending instruments). 
e) Not everyone will agree on the speed of consolidation – and hence on the 
size of pb increases per period. This is largely a matter of the time profile and 
dynamics, and of the appropriate horizon, not so much the size of different tax and 
spending multipliers. 
f) The ability to lower interest rates, and with them risk premia, varies with 
the reputation and debt structure of the policy authorities, and with their capacity to 
create growth. 
g) Similarly, the tolerance and opportunity to create competitiveness via a 
devaluation of relative wages, prices or non-wage costs varies across different 
economies. The same applies to the scope for productivity gains, which vary with 
economic structures and the availability of policy levers. 
h) Finally, there is the issue of what to do if the scale of the adjustments 
needed (in real exchange rates, competitiveness or primary surpluses) are just too 
large or would take too long. 
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Two formal results: The central results of Alesina’s work on the optimal 
size and number of nations revolve around his decentralisation theorem: it is 
economically more efficient for local governments to provide Pareto-optimal levels 
of output than for a central government to attempt to provide a uniform level.  
This implies decentralisation gains will increase with the variability in the 
demand for public goods. 
Second, decentralisation reduces the costs of mobility and information 
costs, but raises the administrative, coordination, and lack of economies of scale 
costs. Decentralisation creates its benefits through horizontal competition (Tiebout 
competition between states at the same level in a policy hierarchy) and vertical 
competition (Breton competition between states and the centre). 
These observations lead to a second theorem. If the central government 
chooses the degree of centralisation, then people or states will choose the amount 
and type of public goods available. Result: Centralisation then falls with increasing 
taste differences; with increasing democracy; with the level of income; and with 
country size.  
Do these results have a counterpart in the real world? One example: 
Scotland is more social democratic leaning (compared to England with its natural 
Conservative majority). This is a taste difference. Second, local democracy 
increased with the creation of the Scottish Parliament and devolution in 1999. 
Third, the economy has recovered, relative to UK, since the 1970s and now 
marginally outperforms the rest of the UK in a restrictive “one-size-fits-all” 
economic frame-work. Hence income levels have increased against the traditional 
benchmark; and would offer good prospects of further and faster increases if 
Scotland had access to her own policy levers to tailor policies to her own needs. 
Finally the UK is not small, and has a distinct “celtic fringe” which has been 
growing in cultural importance. Result: a separatist movement has now taken 
control, and is leading the country to an independence referendum in 2014. 
General Evidence: Is there evidence for these size and break-up 
propositions on a wider scale? Empirical studies (Panizza 2004; Desmet et al, 
2011) show that democracy and fractionalisation of the body politic are the main 
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drivers for the creation or break-up of nations – more than other factors. However, 
the forces of decentralisation or centralisation are not static. Jefferson’s often 
quoted speech on independence makes the point. Predictably there have been 
adjustments from decentralisation to greater autonomy over time by the provinces 
in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, UK. Perhaps the classic case is Quebec in 
Canada, which has gone from conventional province to the brink of independence 
and then back to a distinct form of asymmetric autonomy.  
The reason for this must be the secessionist calculation: are the net benefits 
under secession greater than the utility under union? This is not always the case; 
several of the separatist movements quoted above have receded. This issue has 
yet to be decided in Scotland, however. But if secession benefits are not large 
enough, then fiscal autonomy (“devolution max”) is the obvious alternative; the one 
most often adopted by the participants in secessionist debates when outright 
independence is not, or is no longer, an option. 
Two final points with empirical content in this literature: Alesina’s no mobility 
assumption, by which he means mobility decreases the need for decentralisation 
since people who wish for a different regime can simply go elsewhere. A classic 
example is the English dissent, trade and emigration to the American colonies in 
the 1600s. The contrast, to prove the point, is the central control of trade and land 
which stifled French colonisation in the Americas in the 1700s and the Spanish-
American colonies in the 1800s.  
A second example is the C-stability property: an entity with sufficient dissent 
will break-up until the remaining elements have less distance between themselves 
than distance from those now on the outside. As an illustration, Massachusetts 
started as a single colony, but religious dissent led to a faction leaving to set up a 
new colony in Rhode Island. Massachusetts then stabilised. A contemporary 
example is Yugoslavia where the advent of democracy, together with clear 
economic and income differences, and historical-cultural differences, led to a 
break-up into 7 smaller republics – just as Alesina’s second theorem earlier in this 
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section said it would.13 Those smaller republics have, with the passage of time, 
now stabilised. 
Specific Implications: Scotland’s exit from the UK’s political and/or currency 
union: 
i) Self-determination leads to more countries being formed than may be 
efficient from a world-wide perspective. This is a natural result. It reflects the 
difference between non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes in a game where 
countries internalise the costs they impose on others, but can relieve the costs 
imposed on them by others through separation. Obviously this depends on the 
distribution of costs vs. benefits across the union; on whether the costs of union 
exceed the benefits of coordinated behaviour. Years of slower growth, lower 
investment (despite lower unit labour costs), social dependency, no capacity to 
respond to the agglomeration effects of London, and constant subsidies going 
south, have convinced many Scots that the costs are too high. 
ii) Internal coalitions often trigger separation even when coalition members 
are not natural allies. This is because countries can then capture gains from those 
outside to pay for losses in efficiency when they separate. For example, all Scottish 
political parties want control of corporation tax to redress the cost and location 
advantages, economies of scale, and unfair/excess competition from the 
agglomeration of south-east England. Similarly, the success of the independence 
campaign may rest on the Greens voting with the Nationalists to achieve their 
goals – rather than linking up with established parties at the European level. 
iii) The number of countries increases with international economic 
integration: globalisation goes with localisation. Example: Scotland’s separatism 
started as the EU becomes a reality; the economic links continue, but now with no 
trade barriers and a common single currency outside. Another example is the 
discovery of oil and gas in the Scottish sector of the North Sea. This made 
                                                          
13 This example is prompted by Desmet et al’s (2011) analysis of the forces behind 
Yugoslavia’s break-up. 
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Scotland a potential player in the world markets in her own right, rather than a 
constituent economy in the wider UK. 
iv) The number of countries will rise if utility from public spending increases, 
and if government is relatively efficient and cheap (as it is in Scotland or 
Scandinavia, compared to the UK or the Euro-zone respectively) – as well as rising 
with preference differences.  
v) Compensation schemes to preserve the union invites time inconsistency 
in political decision making (“sunk costs sink the transfers”). Examples of this are 
common. Scotland believes the original union treaty with England, a treaty 
between equals with exit rights, has not been upheld. Tatarstan found that offers of 
local policy powers were unilaterally and rapidly withdrawn by the Russian 
government after the electorate voted no to independence. The same could 
happen on a “no” vote in Scotland. On the other hand, a sufficiently close “no” 
result triggered further moves to autonomy in Quebec, Flanders, South Tyrol and 
parts of Spain. Either way, increased pressure for independence is widely seen as 
the best guard against time inconsistency by the centre. 
vi) Summary: Unlike the UK in the EU case below, Scotland’s differences 
with the UK are largely a matter of taste, priorities and culture or history: a 
preference for social democracy, local democracy(federalism), better economic 
performance, a smaller more cohesive society – in short a case of “C-instability” 
within the UK union, rather than insufficient mobility. 
Specific Implications: the drivers of the UK’s potential exit from the EU. 
The drivers of calls for a British exit from the EU are very different from the 
Scottish case. They both have some “C-instability” elements, but that is all. That is 
to say, the internal differences in priorities and aspirations – significant within the 
UK, but relatively small in Scotland – are a lot smaller than the distance between 
the UK’s sense of her own interests and way of doing things, and those of the EU’s 
average policymaker or economic centre of gravity. There are exceptions of 
course: the UK has a lot in common with Germany on the single market and 
financial regulation, with France on defence and security, with the Netherlands and 
Poland on deregulation and the importance of access to free markets, etc. But 
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there are many other things on which she doesn’t agree: further integration 
(deepening rather than widening), the single currency, political union, fiscal union, 
the social chapter, market regulation (especially in the labour market), and so on.  
Britain finds it hard to identify with any of those initiatives and, in contrast to 
Scotland, has very little sense of “European identity” – although none of these 
issues are actually imposed on her, given the degree of detachment currently 
afforded her under the existing treaties and opt-outs. So these elements of 
distance may not make much difference if the UK left the EU (in the sense that 
things on the ground would not change much); on the other hand, these factors 
don’t offer any real reason to stay either. In other words, perceptions tend to play a 
larger role than reality.  
Hence, in view of the framework above, the drivers for separation are: 
i) The implication of this part of the UK’s attitude is that it might generate a 
lot of heat rather than light, but once people get down to what functions/decisions 
might or should be repatriated the list becomes quite short – as the British and 
Dutch government exercises to determine the scope for repatriation have 
discovered. For Britain, the gains from being in the EU are from membership of the 
single market; the costs are from the single currency initiative, fiscal or political 
union, financial and market regulation etc which she doesn’t participate in anyway.  
ii) “Distance” from Europe may therefore figure a lot in political rhetoric, but 
is unlikely to play much of a role in actual decisions. A lack of mobility, relative to 
elsewhere in the EU, is likely to be more important because differences in culture, 
asymmetric language skills, and different expectations for society or for legal and 
democratic processes may have limited the effective scope for mobility. Or 
because of the comparative success of the economy till 2007 lowered the 
opportunity costs of leaving, relative to the ease of connections to the rest of the 
world where language, legal, cultural differences, and long-standing commercial or 
personal relationships offer much smaller barriers. Thus, in terms of the motives for 
separation above, “decentralisation” from the rest of the world was not needed – 
mobility was enough – which implies the pressure to separate (“decentralise”) from 
the EU, where mobility was lower, would inevitably rise. 
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iii) The sense of time inconsistency is important. Britain thought she was 
getting an unfettered single market, but now finds a myriad of extra regulations 
driven by financial difficulties and a poor Euro-zone economic performance that 
she hadn’t bargained on – not least from financial regulation which the UK believes 
is an infringement of the single market (the financial trans-actions tax, bonus caps, 
the incomplete banking union etc). To that we can add the moves to fiscal union, 
the fiscal compact, undisciplined fiscal behaviour that was not controlled, and the 
failure of the services industries directive and financial services directive. 
iv) As a result: the net gains from EU membership, smaller than expected 
because of the damage to the single market, now look a lot smaller than the 
increased costs of union membership. 
iv) Britain, like many other countries, faces increasing fractionalism in her 
political life. This is usually put down to the emergence of the UK independence 
party which, like most single theme parties, does not have the appeal to win office 
itself; but does have the power to undermine the established parties and thereby 
play the role of kingmaker – at least in terms of the policies adopted. The 
difference in the UK’s case is that the established parties are all split on the 
wisdom of EU membership question (the Conservatives most obviously, but across 
the voter base of the other parties too). This gives fractionalism in the UK a much 
greater scope to stoke up pressures for separation than elsewhere in the EU. 
v) There are of course underlying taste differences: for lower taxation, for 
less social market economy, for freer markets and deregulation, a greater 
tolerance for financial inequalities. 
vi) Size matters. Being the (arguably) second largest EU economy, Britain 
gets frustrated that she has trouble getting her ideas across and accepted where it 
matters. This is hardly surprising given her reluctant approach to further integration 
and many of the EU’s pet projects. But, in compensation, there is less risk in 
allowing this frustration to show since the UK derives less than 40% of her foreign 
exchange earnings from the EU; and likewise, EU foreign investment  to or from 
the UK is a significant minority. Other markets beckon. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Unlike in the popular song, breaking up is in fact not hard to do. Far from 
being abstract, the conditions for when it becomes a possibility are rather easily 
satisfied and are generally in evidence where there are separatist movements.  
What Europe needs, therefore, is institutions rather than policies: a) to give 
members the sense of owning an impartial and independent economic framework 
that they operate and control (at least notionally); b) to create a structure which 
reflects the interests of those a succession would leave behind as well as those 
who wish to separate; and c) to create a broader, more flexible and more 
accommodating set of institutions within which economies with different 
aspirations, priorities and market structures can perform successfully without 
creating tensions or costly spillovers, but not find themselves so restricted that they 
could do better outside.  
It is obvious that the last is the most important of these conclusions. Europe 
(and the UK for that matter) needs to recognise that: if they wish to preserve their 
unions, they need to make it positively worthwhile for their members to remain 
members in terms of their members’ own goals and priorities. In the game theory 
terms, this is simply a matter of incentive compatibility. It is significant that, despite 
the violent protests and political instability in Greece, Cyprus, Spain, it was the 
Euro-zone’s policies and inability to complete the required institutional and financial 
regulation arrangements which came in for real criticism and demands for change. 
Those protests always stopped short of leaving the Euro and ECB – institutions 
widely seen to be independent, impartial, and where necessary accommodating. 
The proof of the pudding (and this lecture) is indeed in the eating. 
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